Greg Detre
Monday, 25 March, 2002
Reading � Williams in Grayling
Introduction �
what the subject is about
moral philosophy = the philosophical, reflective study of certain values that concern human beings
these values inform people�s lives, in decisions and commments/judgements on people/actions
we try to shape our lives by reference to such values
some kinds of life are more worth living than others, and we want our children to share our outlook
we usually accept moral constraints on what we do
moral philosophy tries to understand certain kinds of reason for action
ethical = (from Gk for personal character) carries a braoder conception, including conern with the vlaue of different kinds of life + activity
moral (from Latin for social custom) = narrower interest � rules + obligations, and related experiences/considerations
�moral� is often used as though it is supposed to make an important difference whether a given consideration/feeling is/is not of the moral kind
this contrast is especially sharp with theories of moral value that emphasis the will
ethical/moral vs:
self-interested concerns � can be drawn in different places, e.g. the claims of my family may represent an ethical demand on me as against purely selfish interests, but may be selfish compared to wider society/community demands
aesthetic, economic, political, religious considerations
meta-ethics = higher-order moral philosophy
higher-order = e.g. natural science studies natural phenomena, while philosophy of science studies the operations of science
meta-ethics discusses:
the nature of moral judgements
whether they express genuine beliefs
whether they can be objectively true
etc.
30-50 years ago � analytical philosophy considered all philosophy to be meta-ethics
based on belief in a firm distinction between fact/value or is/ought
requires you to show that all value can be expressed in terms of �ought�
two further assumptions:
1. philosophy should be about �fact� (which includes theory)
2. meta-ethics itself can be value-neutral, i.e. that studying the nature of ethical thought does not commit you to any substantive moral conclusions
further assumption sometimes made:
3. meta-ethics should be linguistic in style � its study should be �the language of morals�
see Hare�s book of that name � his meta-ethical view was that:
a moral outlook consists of moral principles
principles are universal prescriptions
a prescription = sort of like an imperative
this conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of moral language
earlier: believed that this would not commit you to any substantive views
later: decided that a correct analysis will show that the use of moral language commits one to a certain kind of moral outlook, which, given the facts of what the world is like, will yield substantive moral conclusions
the values don't follow from facts/theories alone, but from the fact that you have chosen to use moral language at all, which commits you to a specific kind of moral outlook, which philosophy can then consider and derive substantive conclusions from
ethics is not, after all, just meta-ethics
nowadays: most philosophers have abandoned more of the original assumptions than Hare has
it is doubted that meta-ethics can be value-neutral
most ethics involves substnative moral positionss, sometimes closely associated with a meta-ethical outlook, sometimes free-standing
the contribution of philosophy (+ philosophers) lies in making theoretical distinctions and structures, rather than through insight/experience of the world
aim of ethical theory = cast the content of an ethical outlook into theoretical form
an ethical theory must contain some meta-ethics
since it takes one view rather than another of what the structure and the central concepts of ethical thought must be
ethical theories are to different degrees revisionary:
some start with a supposedly undeniable basis for ethics, and reject everyday moral conclusions that conflict with it
others consider the conflicting outlooks and decide which outlooks make the most coherent systematic sense of those conclusions that we find most convincing
moral intuitions = unsystematised but carefully-considered judgements about what we would think it right to do in a certain situation, or would be prepared to say in approval/critcisim of people/actions
the term �intuition� here has a purely methodological force � it means only that these judgements seem to us pre-theoretically convincing, not that they are dervied a from some faculty of intuiting moral truths
reflective equilibrium (Rawls) = modify theory to accommodate robust intuitions, and discard some intuitions that clash with the theory
e.g. the difference between positively intervening vs allowing things to happen
or intervening in a way that directly aggresses on someone else vs intervening in a way that does not
three basic types of moral theory, centring on:
|
|
centring on |
bearing ethical value |
|
consequentialism |
consequences (obligation to bring about the best consequences) |
good states of
affairs the right action = that which tends to bring about good states of affairs |
|
deontological |
duty/obligation (unlike the obligation of consequentialism, there are many rather than one obligations) |
right action sometimes what makes an action right is a fact about its consequences usually its rightness depends on respect for others� rights or other of the agent�s obligations |
|
virtue theories |
virtues |
good person (an ethically admirable person) |
right = the rights of otherss to expect cetain behaviour
from that agent
consequentialists (especially utilitarians) view rights as derivative, or even spurious (�nonsense on stilts� (Bentham))
the thoughts of a good person will not necessarily consist very much of thoughts about virtues, but rather will be more about the other ethical concepts (like rights + consequences)
therefore, virtue theory is not on the same level as the other two types of theory, and cannot displace the other ethical concepts
consequentialism = the basic bearer of ethical value is good states of affairs
the worth of actions is basically assessed in terms of their tendency to bring about such states of affairs
however, some valuable states of affairs are not caused by, but consist of, certain actions being performed (e.g. enjoyable actions)
while some consequentialists are more pluralist about the sources of value
e.g. Moore, who supposed tha pleasure, friendship and other things could have value independently of one another
utilitarianism focuses on just maximising �welfare� (or �utility�)
however, welfare/utility stands for agents� getting what they want/prefer (or would want/prefer if they were well-informed)
the actual content of this utility may be various, and include both egoistic + altruistic objects
this is more flexible than earlier versions (where utility was defined in terms of �pleasure and the absence of pain� or �the greatest happiness of the greatest number�)
however, this utility must be summable across different people so that total states can be compared (ranked against each other)
utilitarianism = sum-ranking welfarist consequentialism
problems with utilitarianism:
� the difficulty of summing + ranking
� implausibility/unintelligibility of welfarism
welfarism = the attempt to reduce all human values/objectives to something like preference satisfaction
problems:
whose preferences are at issue (e.g. with population control)
false to reduce aesthetic and (differently) environmenal values to matters of what people happen to like/prefer
problems with consequentialism:
� ignores the separateness (+ rights) of persons, and is prepared illegitimately to sacrifice the interest of any given person with the aim of increasing the aggregate welfare
� integrity objection = the agent is related to the world simply as a producer of states of affairs � all that matters is what state of affairs is produced
leaves no place for agents as specially responsible for his own actions
has a problem making sense of qualities such as integrity
different types of utilitarianism:
act (direct) utilitarianism = applies the criterion of welfare maximisation directly to individual actions
the moral value of an action is calcluated in terms of its specific results
problems for act utilitarianism:
it does not follow necessarily from this that agents must deliberate in utilitarian terms, but it seems impossible to avoid
but if each agent in a group tries to bring about the best overall result without any co-ordination, it�s likely to be inefficient
individuals are likely to be ignorant about the consequences of their actions
individuals are likely to suffer from bias, prioritising their own/friends� welfare
often gives what common-sense morality would regard as the wrong answer (especially giving too low a weight to considerations of justice)
indirect utilitarianism = applies the welfarist criterion to some item more general than particular actions, e.g. rules, institutions or dispositions � two-level structure
problems for indirect utilitarianism:
if agents are supposed to be themselves aware of the theory, how are they supposed both to:
stick with values of justice, loyalty etc. where this goes against the balance of welfare
and at the same time be aware that these values (rather, their acceptance of these values) are just a device to increase welfare
Government House utilitarianism (e.g. Sidgwick) = assuming that the people who stick strongly with the first-level values and th epeople who understand their utilitarian rationale are not the same people � alienation
belief in rights = the interests of separate agents are not fungible (precisely replaceable), and that the rights of one person can make a categorical requirement on the actions of another
negative requirements = things that A cannot do to B
even in the interests of the general welfare, e.g. to kill him (secretly) to distribute his organs among five worthy people who need transplants
demand that A act in certain ways on B�s behalf, e.g. the right of people to receive help in emergencies
is this a positive right???
problems with rights:
conflicts of rights
can rights be violated to avoid some large disaster?
even if the disaster doesn't involve anyone�s rights being violated
for example???
rigorists vs pragmatists:
�rights are trumps� (Dworkin) � the whole point of rights is that they don't enter into a maximising calculation
there comes a point at which purism becomes moral frivolity
and if the disaster does involve someone�s rights being violated, but by someone other than the agent who is making this deliberation
is this the �Joe and the Indians� scenario???
this is related to the idea that each of us is specially responsible for his own actions
so it is still not ok to break my promise even if I know that two other promises will be broken if I don't
rights theories are often contractualist
contractualism = the idea of an agreement that might be rationally arrived at by parties in some hypothetical situation in which they are required to make rules by which they can live together
just as actual legal contracts generate rights
emphasises at the ground level the separateness of the parties and their several interests
although (the belief in) rights can be supported by other theories
e.g. indirect consequentialism could argue for a belief in rights on the basis of the good consequences of such a belief
but Williams thinks it will still find that the actions + thoughts it licenses on a ground level are remote from the consequentialist spirit that is supposed ultimately to justify them
also, there are contractualist theories that have consequentialist results
contractualism goes back to Kant:
although he didn't express himself explicitly in terms of a contract, he his conception of a notional republic of moral agents (the �Kingdom of Ends�), each of whom can see himself as laying down laws for eveyrone including himself, embodies the basic idea
constructivist = rejected any dogmatic foundation of ethics (derived from religion or a priori knowledge of some realm of values)
humanity had now reached a point of self-conscious development at which it is on its own and must construct its own values, rather than have them delivered from a higher authority
Kant relied on a commitment to the basic principle of morality (the Categorical Imperative) being presupposed by the very activity of a rational agent
Rawls:
set of contracting parties reaching an agreement behind a �veil of ignorance� was designed to constuct a theory of social justice
the veil of ignorance is introduced to disguise from each contractor his own particular advantages and disadvantages and his own eventual position in the society being designed
any contractualist theory of morality has to have some way of distancing the parties� thoughts from their actual situation, otherwise you would have a contract merely serving the contingent interests of the parties (in opposition to the impartiality + general application of morality)
Scanlon: acceptable rules are those that could not be �reasonably rejected� by parties seeking a basis for uncoerced coexistence
Gauthier: (alternative contractualist model)
tries to show that it�s in each agent�s egoistic interest to become a �constrained maximiser�, someone who limits his pursuit of self-interest by respect for the interests of others
this is different from Rawls etc.
they try to model morality on a ctonract between parties who area already committed to some shared moral life
whereas Gauthier argues in purely self-interested terms for the moral life
Williams thinks that once Gauthier allows some empirical considerations in his account, he should open it to many more, and admit from the beginning that human beings have many rational motivations besides pure egoism on the one hand and morality on the other
two different issues:
prospects of rational agreement in ethical matters
semantic status of moral judgements = whether they are, typically, statements at all (rather than (e.g.) prescriptions) and whether they aim at truth
objectivity is best understood in terms of the prospects of rational agreement
i.e. that there can be such fundamental differences in ethical outlook that there is is no rational way of arriving at agreement
emotivism (associated with positivism) = moral utterances are merely expressions of emotion, almost like expletives, and not objective
some sophisticated accounts of emotivism leave some room for objectivity, even at the emotional level
e.g. Kant or Hare
virtue theory � also objective, while still non-commital about the semantics involved
Aristotle believed that experienced + discriminating agents brought up properly would reach rational agreement in action, feeling, judgement + interpretation � also, rational agreement over the best human development
Hume insists that morality is a matter of feeling + sentiment, even implies that there is just as much virtue or vice in anything as each of us cares to find in it
but he claims just as strongly that nothing counts as a moral judgement/reaction unless the sentiments involved in it are based on a �steady and general view� of the situation, which involves the correction of our feelings by judgement
as when we realise that we are not really entitled to the view that this is a bad man, but only to the more personal/partisan reaction that he is (e.g.) a nuisance to us/our friends
the general sentiments of mankind about moral matters were very much the same at all times/places
you can't really describe Hume as an objectivist, but in terms of rational agreement it offers more objectivity than its own formulations invite one to expect
however, even if objectivity need not imply rational agreement in belief, arguably the converse holds
beliefs are true or false � if moral judgements express beliefs, then some are true, and there is such a thing as truth in morality
objections:
too easy to admit that moral judgements admit truth + falsehood � alternative semantic analyses
see Blackburn�s response to Geach
even if moral jdugements can be true or false, that says nothing
e.g. �redundancy� (or �minimalist???) theories: claiming that �P is true� does no more than assert that �P�
i.e. that all there is to truth is the equivalence that every truth theory must accept, ��P� is true if and only if P�
if this is correct, then the truth/falsehood of moral judgements follows simply from their taking a statemental form
if objectivity is to be more substantive + interesting than truth, in the redundancy theory, it will not follow just from the fact that moral judgements can be true/false
widely agreed that an adequate theory of truth needs to go beyond the redundancy view, but how far?
Wiggins: the claim that a proposition is true implies that there could be convergence in belief in the proposition under favourable circumstances, bringing �truth� nearer to �objectivity�
Wright: a properly �minimalist� theory of truth need not bring in such a strong condition
Williams: a lot turns on how strongly we take the idea that disagreement on moral issues can be rationally resolved, and what will count as �favourable circumstances� for resolving it
perhaps every serious moral claim allows for the possibility of rationally resolving disagreements within (and only within) a certain range of circumstances
but may be irresolvable outside that range, perhaps because of a shortage of relevant information, or because of the nature of the disagreement
may be necessary to drop the limiting assumption made so far that all �moral judgements� are essentially of the same kind and stand in the same relation to matters like truth + objectivity
objectivism + the mere truth of moral statements are often assimilated in meta-ethical discussion, often along with realism
in the philosophy of maths or science, it can be agreed that statements of a certain kind (e.g. about number or theroetical entities like subatomic particles) are capable of truth, and can command rational agreement, without our being certain whether those statements should be interpreted realistically
interpreted realistically ≈ the statements are taken to refer to objects that exist independently of our thoughts about them
difficult to give a determinate sense to this question
often contrasted in philosophy of science with operationalism
operationalism = accepting the theory commits only to using it as a predictive device
it is unclear what more is being claimed if you say instead that �protons do exist � really�
parallel claims/problems in moral philosophy � it is not trivial that realism follows from the claim that moral statements are true/false
it is clear that realism implies that:
such statements can be true
and
there is something for them to be true of
but it is not clear whether it implies objectivism (maybe depending on how sceptical you are about our being able to grasp realism�s reality)
however, objectivism does not imply realism (since objectivism (e.g. Kantian) need not even imply that at the most basic level moral positions consist of statements)
you can understand realism in ethics in terms of explanation:
Harman: moral facts have no independent explanatory power
part of Harman�s argument is that some phenomena are of course explained by our moral beliefs, but we would have the same beliefs even if there were no moral facts (criticised by Sturgeon) (??? pg 561)
Railton: moral facts are
constituted by natural facts (of a kind congenial to utilitarianism) and it
follows from this that they can be explanatory (???)
but even if Harman is right, it only show that moral facts do not have the causal powers of ordinary empirical facts � and why should they?
Blackburn (following Mackie, similar to Hume): the moral properties of people/actions/etc. are not �in the world� but are �projected� on to it from our feelings + reactions
offers an account of moral language to explain why language does not make this truth obvious, but instead tends to make us think that there is a moral truth independent of our experiences, so encouraging realist + objectivist theories � part of �quasi-realism�
quasi-realism = secondary qualities (e.g. colours) are also projected on to the world, and this raises the question whether the metaphor has not mislocated the most significant issues about moral properties (??? pg 562)
an anti-realism that gives moral properties much the same status as colours will probably satisfy many moral realists
a pressing question for the metaphor of projection: on to what kind of world are moral properties supposedly projected?
the position regarding secondary qualities seems to imply that it is a world characterised merely in terms of physical theory
this implies, presumably, that ethical outlooks are �perspectival� (related to human experience) in ways that physical theory is not
it will not tell us anything very distinctive about ethical realism to know only that ethical concepts are perspectial in a sense in which colour concepts, or psychological concepts, are also perspectival
interesting questions that the projection metaphor doesn't encourage us to ask:
how far can the moral concepts and outlooks of various human groups intelligibliy differ while the rest of their ways of describing the world (especially their psychological concepts for describing people�s behaviour) remain the same?
how far can their psychological concepts themselves intelligibly vary, and how should we understand those variations?
distinguish between different kinds of ethical statements:
thin ethical concepts = statements expressed in terms of �right�, �ought� or �good�
the truth conditions for such concepts are very elusive
thick ethical concepts = e.g. betrayal, brutality, cowardice (from our own culture)
have a higher descriptive content
whether a given use of a thick concept yields a true or false statement seems to be determined to a great extent by the state of the world
centralism = the false position that thin concepts are more basic than thick ones, and that thick concepts are just thin concepts with some useful package of descriptive features attached
Hurley holds that conclusions using thin concepts, to be intelligible, must always supervene on judgements using thick ones
underestimates how much thin concepts can be used autonomously (e.g. utilitarianism)
it may be that one cannot grasp the sense of a thick ethical concepts without grasping its evaluative point (McDowell)
their use may also support some versions of realism
(??? pg 563)
cognitivism = often used interchangeably with �objectivism� and �realism�, and is sometimes equated with the mere possibility that moral statements can be true or false
it seems hard to deny that there can be knowledge under thick ethical concepts
all the time, we take ourselves to know such things as that a certain action was cruel or that a certain person was dishonest
yet the idea of a moral expert is very suspect � this objection has most force against a view of moral knowledge as theoretical
a more recognisable picture is of a person who is good at understanding situation which raise moral questions, and can helpfully suggest the moral light in which a problem can be seen
ties up helpfully with the idea of knowledge under thick concepts, since such ethical advisers can suggest ways in which a situation falls or doesn't fall under such concepts (assuming they share thick concepts)
thick concepts are not constant across cultures/times (e.g. consider chastity over the last century)
this is why it does not go far enough to say that there is �no altenrative� to think a that a given act was cruel � it overlooks the alternative of not thinking in terms of cruelty at all
different individuals/groups who use the same concepts can reach reasoned agreement � and so be true, express knowledge and be objective
but it does cast doubt on larger claims of moral cognitivism, e.g. that ethical inquiry might lead to an agreement about what concepts to use in our ethical dealings with the world (in the way that scientific concepts best fit the requirements of theory + explanation)
the variation in ethical concepts may raise doubts about realism
since it places higher demands than truth, objectivity + knowledge in suggesting that the different ethical conceptual systems of different groups are all perspectives on one ethical reality
i.e. in which all the different local systems could fit together, and that their difference constitute intelligibly different versions/aspects of that one structure
we do not know whether such a picture is possible
relativism = each outlook is appropriate in its own place, or that other people�s practices are right �for them�
reaction to the fact that different cultures vary in their ethical practice
difficult to formalise without:
� losing the relativist spirit
e.g. proposing local variations (e.g. based on context/circumstances) within an absolute morality
� or becoming incoherent
the all-important relation governs the application of the rule/practice, and moreover, that the relevant groups (to whom the relativisation is made) are picked out by reference to their being the people who have this rule/practice
the structure of relativism is given by:
� two outlooks (sets of rules/moral codes/etc.)
� two groups (societies/cultures/etc.)
distinguished from one another by the fact that they have respectively those two outlooks
relativism = each outlook applies to/binds only its own group
i.e. is saying something about the attitude that it is appropriate for one ethical outlook to have towards another
difficult to find something consistent, coherent and helpful to say
e.g. leave them and those who hold them alone � except this is not relativist, but more like an absolute principle of toleration
general problem: formulating an attitude to take towards others would be a normative commitment that breaks its own restrictions
semantic relativism (Harman) = �ought� statements (roughly) have as part of their semantic content a reference to a society to which the morality in question, and hence the statement is relativized
Williams considers various issues + problems
the basic problem with relativism then is that there is almost no serious ethical issue for which �other than mine� forms an interesting class of societies/cultures
cultures bear various relations to one�s own, being distant, congenial, threatening, interesting, overlapping etc. but relativism can do nothing with these important distinctions
he thinks the coherent thing that relativism says is something to the effect that one�s moral comments about the other should be restrained, and be aware that we are only one lot of people among others and our moral outlook only one contingent product among others
we should question rather than judge
moral psychology = the philosophical psychology of morality
two different questions come under the internalism/externalism debate:
(assuming that if an agent acknowledges that he has a reason to act in a certain way)
1. about moral beliefs and their connection to motivation
is every moral belief such that if an agent holds it, he must acknowledge that he as a reason to act in a certain way, and so (granted the assumption) be motivated to act in that way?
obviously no � e.g. my moral belief that the Roman emperor Heliogabalus was a spectactularly nasty man is presumably some kind of moral belief, but it does not give me any reason for action
are there some moral beliefs such that an agent who accepts the belief must acknowledge a reason to act?
obviously yes � one kind of moral belief, presumable, is �I have a moral reason to act in this way�
externalism with regard to thick ethical concepts = seeing that a certain of his would be (e.g.) generous without supposing that this gives him a reason to do it
but, the case for internalism about such concepts is that someone who really uses such a concept to structure his experience (rather than just mimicking others� use) will have a pattern of evaluations, reactions + sentiments which are tied to (specific reasons for) action
obligations � make externalism look plausible
e.g. be under an obligation and yet not feel a motivation to do it
but at the same time, there cannot be such a practice unless in general people are commited to it, and those who are committed to it will acknowledge an obligation as a kind of reason for action (thus an internalist connection at the more general level)
2. what it is to have a reason for action: what are the connections between having a reason to do a certain thing and being motivated to do that thing?
what if one agent tells another that he has a reason to do something, when the latter do not acknowledge that he has that reason?
internalist answer: A has a reason to do X only if he could arrive at a decision to do X by a sound deliberative route (any errors in relevant factual information are corrected) from his existing motivation state
(� ??? pg 570)
virtue theory does not offer an ethical theory in thes ense in which utilitarianism does
a modern account is likely to agree with Aristotle that virtues are dispositions of character, acquired by ethical training, displayed not just in action but in patterns of emotional reaction, that virtues are not rigid habits but flexible under the application of practical reason
the word for virtues in Gk means �excellences�
four areas where a modern account may disagree with Aristotle:
1. ground
the Aristotelian virtues had a teleological ground (they represented the fullest development of a certain kind of natural creature, a non-defective male human being)
we wouldn't now exclude women or �natural slaves�
debatable how much modern thought can share about the natural basis of the virtues, and how strongly Aristotle�s own teleological view should be taken
one interpretation: he had an overall teleological conception of the contents of the universe, with each kind of creature fitting into a discoverable overall pattern
substantial parts of the theory of the virtues will be discoverable by top-down systematic inquiry about what sort of creatures human beings are, and so what their best life will be
more moderate account: a hermeneutical inquiry into what we, now, regard as the most basic and valuable aspects of human beings
2. content
Aristotle lacks a historical dimension
MacIntyre � tries to give an evaluative acccount of the history of virtue ethics by appealing to its development within various traditions
he chooses very different virtues � ignores kindness, mainly considers fairness within (civic + political) justice, only considers truthfulness within boasting/modesty
Aquinas incorporated Christian virtues, and Hume used Aristotle + other pagan sources for a non-Christian ethics
it seems that ideas of human nature + circumstances are open to wide reinterpretation as values change
although there are some constants of human psychology and so some ubiquitous virtues
e.g. courage, self-control (anger and lust), prudence
3. unity
Aristotle followed Socrates in believing in the unity of the virtues
Socrates: might be only one virtue, a kind of normative sense
the conventional distinction between virtues would refer only to different fields of application of this sense
Aristotle believed in different virtues, but one could not have one virtue without having them all
because one could not properly possess even one virtue unless one had phronesis
phronesis = �practical reason�, or better, �judgement� or �good sense�
central capacity to make sense of what one is doing
if you had this quality, then you had all the virtues
inter-relations of the virtues, e.g. without a sense of justice, you can't be generous (because generosity requires giving more than someone is entitled to)
but from a psychological point of view, it�s hard to deny that someone could have some virtues while lacking others
especially the �executive virtues� (courage + self-control) can surely be deployed in wicked projects
seems to be an ethical reluctance to give moral accolades to bad people
Aristotle�s ethical ideal = balanced + moderate character (doctrine of the Mean)
Williams: rather, the fact that the virtues can be partly separated gives some point to virtue theory
some modern ethical theories imply basically only one moral disposition
e.g. benevolence in utilitarianism, or duty in Kantianism, or an all-purpose normative ability
one advantage of virtue theory is that it allows for interesting psychological connections between the ethical and other aspects of character, accepting that a person�s temperament will have something to do with how he conducts himself ethically
for the same reason, virtue theory is implicitly opposed to sharp boundaries between the moral + non-moral
likely to acknowledge a spectrum of desirable characteristics
Aristotle does not try to draw a line around desirable characteristics of specially moral significance � only between excellences of character and of intellect
4. reality
Aristotle conceived of the virtues realistically, as dispositional characteristics of people (as substantial as magentic dispositions) acquired by habituation
two sources of doubt:
i. extent to which people�s reactions depend on situation � claimed that they will act in ways that express a given virtue only within a rather narrow range of recognised contexts
ii. ascription � our understanding of people�s behaviour in terms of virtues or other concepts of character is highly interpretive
relates to shared stock of images, history + society (� ??? pg 575)
traditionally seen as a question about the relation between:
1. moral thought + practice
people are typically taken to act freely, in a sense which has something to do with their holding themselves + each other responsible for what they do
2. some proposition about the universe which, if true, seems to threaten the possibility of moral thought or some vital part of it
the proposition varies, but it�s usually metaphysical
in Christian theology � 2 versions:
can human beings act freely + responsibly if an omniscient God eternally knows their actions + thoughts?
necessity for grace, and the ways in which we could conceive the relation between our actions + our salvation
contemporary philosophy:
relations of freedom to determinism
determinism = each state of the world, including our actions, is a strict causal product of earlier states of the world
earlier discussed by Epicureans
Williams: determinism is an obscure + over-ambitious
now, our increasing knowledge of the brain gives us a stronger reason to believe that there are strong causal explanations of our thoughts than that the universe is a deterministic system
the question now is the relation between freedom + the strongest version of psychophyiscal science (in which our experience is represented as a function of brain-states explained as products of earlier brain-states)
compatibilists: we can have the freedom that morality requires even if the �strong scientific� (psychophysical) claim is true, and try to show how this is possible
incompatibilists: we cannot
libertarians = think that we rightly believe in freedom, and so the strong scientific claim is baseless
hard task of making clear how a conviction about moral freedom could tell us in advance about the prospects for psychophysical science
anti-libertarians = think that the strong scientific claim is probably true, and hence that our belief in freedom is probably wrong
need to explain what the illusion of freedom is
reformulate the free will question in terms of:
1. moral � our moral beliefs (especially in freedom + responsibility)
2. metaphysical � some proposition about the world � the strong scientific claim
3. psychological � the psychology that is relevant to morality (especially our use of concepts like choice, intention + trying)
possible conflicts between the:
metaphysical + psychological
i.e. that the strong scientific claim is incompatible with our (really) choosing
part of philosophy of mind � the conflicts may turn out to be illusory, arising out of the mind-body problem/misunderstanding
moral + psychological
(some) thoughts about freedom seem not to square with our best psychological understanding
perhaps from depth psychology, or just a disabused conception of what people are are like
ancient confusion between determinism + fatalism:
fatalism = nothing that happens depends on our actions, or none of our actions depends on our thoughts, or some such manifest fatalistic untruth
we can now understand the traditional problem of free will (conflict between the metaphysical + morality) only as running through consequences wht he metaphysical position supposedly has for our psychology
if it is correct that there are no fundamental conflicts on the metaphysical/psychological border, the the problem of free will is over
but this doesn't mean that compatabilism has won:
compatabilism = usually implies that when we properly grasp morality�s relations to metaphysics, we shall see that our morality (including its beliefs about freedom) works perfect well
but there is no reason to accept this, since there are problems between moralty + a realistic psychology
but these problems do not rest on metaphysics � they may rest simply on quite well-known grounds for thinking that our conceptions of freedom, responsibility + blame are often not what they seem, and are variously exaggerated, self-deceiving, sentimental, vindictive etc.
thus that the existing language of voluntariness is useful but incurably superficial (unable to sustain the deep implications that it has been given in the past)
thus, the metaphysical debates amay prove to have been a distraction from the important task, the principal aim of moral philosophy, of truthfully understanding wht our ethical values are and how they are related to our psychology, and making, in the light of that understanding, a valuation of those values
what does it mean to say that analytical philosophy used to consider that ethics consisted only of meta-ethics???
I suppose that methodology is a meta-ethical question, right???
would intuitionism, say, be a first- or second-order theory then???
what is the �trolley problem� (Foot, 1967)???
more details on the integrity objection � is it the same as the schizophrenia of modern ethics???
how is welfarism unintelligible/implausible??? specifically, how is population control an issue for preference satisfaction???
what�s the difference between Blackburn�s �projected� and �supervene upon�???
where does McDowell stand??? with respect to projectivism???
free will + necessity for grace???
depth psychology??? about the unconscious???